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I. INTRODUCTION

Federal courts historically have been dubbed "the primary and
powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States," yet a party bringing an action in
federal court must first surmount numerous jurisdictional obstacles. 1
Having invested a significant amount of time, money, and other resources
in preparing a claim for federal review, putative plaintiffs may be surprised
when a court ultimately abstains from deciding a case under one of several
judicially-crafted doctrines. 2 Largely predicated on notions of federalism

* J.D., Boston University School of Law; B.A., Cornell University. I offer my sincere thanks to
Dan Tyler, Joanna Grigas, and the members of the Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate
Advocacy. What follows benefitted greatly from their work.
1 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A

(Macmillian Co. 1927).
2 For example, federal courts may abstain where a federal constitutional or statutory issue
may be mooted by an interpretation of state law. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1949) (cautioning against overruling issues of state law in federal court judgments); R.R.
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (finding abstention appropriate because
state law provided easy determination of authority). They may also abstain in cases that involve
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65
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and comity, these principles may ring hollow for those seeking emergency
relief from a constitutional deprivation. 3 For these and other reasons,
federal courts generally do not refuse to exercise jurisdiction and abstention

supposedly serves as "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of
a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.",4 Despite
this "virtually unflagging obligation," however, the
scope of abstention
5
doctrines has expanded significantly in recent years.
Though courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction for a
number of reasons, this article focuses exclusively on abstention under
Younger v. Harris6 In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
generally must abstain from enjoining state criminal proceedings or
otherwise interfering with state criminal prosecutions.7 Since then Younger
has evolved; the doctrine has been steadily enlarged to include quasicriminal proceedings, state administrative proceedings, and even some civil
actions. 8 Concerns about federalism and comity, rather than the original
equitable justifications, now predominate and courts usually justify
abstention by invoking the talisman of "Our Federalism" and voicing a
desire for harmonious relations between federal and state judiciaries. 9

an important state policy interest and implicate unclear state law. See La. Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (recognizing necessity for stay of proceedings
implicating unclear state law); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943) (holding
abstention was appropriate when issues clearly involved important state policy).
3 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (stressing comity and federalism support
bar to adjudication of state criminal prosecution by federal courts). But see Propper, 337 U.S. at
493 (suggesting comity not complete bar to adjudication of state rights).
4 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) (describing
doctrine of abstention as important but circumscribed jurisdictional tool).
5 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citations
omitted).
6 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
7 Id. at 49-50 (forbidding federal courts to stay pending state court criminal proceedings
except under special circumstances).
8 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (explaining Younger abstention may
apply when civil proceedings are pending); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (extending Younger doctrine to administrative judicial
proceedings because important state interests are involved); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 609 (1975) ("[H]old[ing] that Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention
in a state judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate
remedies.").
9 See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasizing notion that federal government
should hesitate to interfere with states' interests).
In Hicks v. Miranda [422 U.S. 332 (1975)] we held that 'where state
criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal
complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits
have taken place in federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should
apply in full force.' An analogous situation is presented here; the principles
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Much has been written about the development and wisdom (or lack thereof)
of these developments. 10 This article charts a more pragmatic course,
exploring the intersection of Younger and preliminary injunctive relief to
resolve a split among the lower federal courts concerning the significance

of temporary restraining orders."
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a comprehensive standard
for the application of Younger in this context. In particular, though one
treatise has reasonably and confidently asserted that abstention is warranted

after "[a] denial of a temporary restraining order" by a federal district court
but not after "the issuance of a temporary restraining order," the federal
courts are actually split on how they view these two occurrences and the

of comity and federalism which call for abstention remain in full force.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); Mallinckrodt LLC v. Littell, 616 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.
Me. 2009) (explaining reasoning behind Younger doctrine).
Younger abstention is founded on twin concerns: 1) the federal courts
presume "the state courts are as capable as their federal counterparts of
guaranteeing federal rights;" and, 2) "[r]elated to this presumption of equal
competency is the concept of comity, which counsels federal courts to be
sensitive to the existence of a parallel system of state governance."
Id. (citing Bettencourt v. Bd. of Reg. in Med. of Commonwealth of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 776-77
(1st Cir. 1990)); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("These
comity and federalism concerns, of course, are at the heart of the Younger doctrine, and have
been the justification for the extension of the doctrine to cases in which non-criminal state
proceedings might be disrupted by an adjudication in a federal court."); see also MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LING. CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 14.03 (2012) ("This doctrine is based
primarily on principles of comity and federalism ....
The doctrine is also supported by the
ancient maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal proceeding.").
10 See, e.g., Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical
Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (finding disproportionately low federal claim success rates
following Younger); Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory ofAbstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530,
531-32 (1989) (suggesting better application of abstention turns on whether federal rights are
threatened); Michael Lewis Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal
Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 499, 502 (1989) (examining relationship between jurisdictional
rules and substantive consequences and arguing Court's opinions "lack credibility"); Martin H.
Redish- Abstention, Separation ofPowers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J.
71, 74 (1984) [hereinafter Redish Abstention] (arguing neither total nor partial judge-made
abstention is acceptable); Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment ofthe Younger Doctrine in Light of
the Legislative History ofReconstruction, 1983 DuKE L.J. 987, 988 (1983) (discussing expansion
of Younger doctrine); Martin H. Redish The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search
of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 465-73 (1978) [hereinafter Redish, The Younger
Doctrine] (discussing rationales for deference in Younger); Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE
L.J. 1103, 1116-17 (1977) (analyzing effect of Younger on Dombrowski); Daniel Jordan Simon,
Comment, Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts Have Opened the Door to the
Eradication of "Our Federalism," 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355, 1379 (2004-2005) (arguing no
doctrinal foundation exists for continuation of abstention as it stands today); David Mason, Note,
Slogan or Substance? Understanding "Our Federalism" and Younger Abstention, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 852, 852 (1988) (examining development of Younger doctrine in federalism context).
11 See infra Part III.
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case law hardly reflects this neat generalization. 12 The most that can be

said definitively is that the "[d]enial of a temporary restraining order and
issuance of such an order might well be viewed differently" by the

Supreme Court.' 3
No court or commentator has outlined a coherent framework for
abstention following proceedings concerning preliminary injunctive relief
A uniform standard governing the application of Younger following these
proceedings is desirable, however, because a consistent approach would
better observe the federalism and comity concerns that motivate abstention,
balance the interests of litigants, and provide guidance in abstention
cases. 14 This article offers a way to resolve the split among the lower
courts as to when abstention is required after the issuance of a temporary
restraining order. 1' Specifically, it argues that viewing the issuance of such

an order in the same manner as the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
the most logical and doctrinally consistent approach.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
The modem Younger doctrine is best described as an exception to a
federal court's duty to exercise jurisdiction where federal adjudication
would disrupt an ongoing state enforcement proceeding. 16 The doctrine
embodies the judicial determination that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with actions pending
12 See 32A AM. JUR. 2D FEDERAL COURTS §

1088 (asserting abstention is not warranted after

granting temporary restraining order); see also, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
238 (1984) ("Whether issuance of the February temporary restraining order was a substantial
federal court action or not, issuance of the June preliminary injunction certainly was."); Fresh
Int'l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It may be
that issuance of a temporary restraining order, as opposed to denial of one, is a proceeding of
substance on the merits."); Hunt v. City of Longview, 932 F. Supp. 828, 834 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
("Whether granting a temporary restraining order is a 'proceeding of substance on the merits' is
unclear."), aff'd, 95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Comm'n of S. Ct. of Ill., 600 F. Supp. 390, 395 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("The Supreme Court has not
been clear on whether, for Hicks purposes, it considered a temporary restraining order a
proceeding of substance.").
13

17B

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4253 (3d

ed. 2011) (discussing applicability of Younger doctrine in different federal proceedings). These
authors went on to observe, quite rightly, that "lower court decisions are of limited use as guides
to the future." Id. "The doctrine is peculiarly the Supreme Court's own creation, the Court has
not been reluctant to alter its contours repeatedly, and interpretations of the doctrine by the lower
courts are not reliable guides until the Supreme Court has spoken to the particular issue." Id.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (reasoning enforcement
action canbe either criminal orcivil); Huffmanv. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975) (same).
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before state judiciaries. 17 "Our Federalism," as the Supreme Court
explained, requires that "the National Government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate

activities of the States."

8

"Perhaps the strongest justification for Younger

deference is the recognized need to avoid disrupting the state judicial
process. ... [and t]his principle has long served as an essential element of
federalism."' 19

Pursuant to Younger, a federal court generally must abstain from
interfering in state proceedings when certain circumstances are present,
even if it properly has jurisdiction over a claim. Younger does not compel

abstention, however, where extraordinary circumstances indicate that a
party will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of federal intervention,

where a state prosecution is brought in bad faith, where a state statute is
patently unconstitutional, where a state proceeding does not provide an
adequate forum for a party's claims, where a state submits to federal
jurisdiction, or where a party waives the abstention argument by failing to

raise it. z2 Outside these exceptions, the federal courts generally must stay
their hand if an ongoing state proceeding implicates important state
interests and the state tribunal is competent to hear federal constitutional
17 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (listing irreparable injury as
extraordinary exception for federal court interference).
1 Id. at 44.
19 Redish, The Younger Doctrine,supra note 10, at 484.
20 See Ohio Bureau of Emp't. Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) ("If the State

voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the
federal court force the case back into the State's own system."); Trainor v. HernAndez, 431 U.S.
434, 446-47 (1977) (noting exception to Younger doctrine where state statute is unconstitutional);
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-25, 126 n.6 (1975) (stating that federal injunctive relief can
be appropriate where irreparable injury can be shown); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3
(1975) (upholding Court's conclusion that board members' pecuniary interest disqualified them
from passing on issues); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 590 (1973) (stating that "those
with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate those disputes");
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965) (finding abstention not required where party
threatens criminal process with no hope of success); Schlagler v. Phillips, 166 F.3d 439, 442 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quoting and discussing Cullenv. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1994)) ("These
factors amounted to bad faith and prompted [the court] to affirm the awarding of injunctive relief
because the plaintiff demonstrated 'the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that
associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith."'); Cullen, 18 F.3d at
103-04 (2d Cir. 1994) (viewing instance as extension of exception for extraordinary
circumstances that threaten irreparable injury). In Cullen, for example, the Second Circuit
explained that to prove irreparable injury under Younger, "the party bringing the state action must
have no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome" or must prove that "a
prosecution or proceeding has been brought to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected
conduct, or [that] a prosecution or proceeding is otherwise brought in bad faith or for the purpose
to harass." Cullen, 18 F.3d at 103 -04.
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claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court "ha[s] since recognized that [its]
concern for comity and federalism is equally applicable to certain other
pending state proceedings," gradually extending Youngerin ways both
topical and temporal. 21
As to the former, Younger has grown beyond state criminal
proceedings and now applies to almost any ongoing state proceeding that
implicates important state interests. 22
The temporal evolution-relating to when Younger is relevant in
the course of litigation-is the main focus of this article. Originally,
Younger abstention was appropriate only if state judicial proceedings were
pending or about to be pending before a federal action was commenced.23
In the absence of a pending state proceeding, the Younger Court opined that
"considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality." 24
The Court extended the doctrine significantly, however, when it held in

Hicks v. Miranda25 that Younger applies to state proceedings initiated
"against []federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before
any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal
court. 2 6 Shortly afterward, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,27 the Court added
that a "prayer for injunction is squarely governed by Younger" where the
"federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had

been decided.,

28

To say that the Court's reasoning in these cases was

unclear would be an understatement. 29 Today, the upshot of Hicks and
21

Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986)

(recognizing applicability of comity and federalism principles to other state proceedings).
22 See id. (expanding Younger doctrine to nearly all ongoing state proceedings implicating
state interests).
23 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (requiring abstention where
state court proceedings are ongoing prior to federal action); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
461-62 (1974) (holding federal intervention not duplicative when there have been no state
proceedings).
24 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462 (examining decision in Younger).
25 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
26 Id. at 349.
27 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
28 Id. at 929.
29 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 353 n.1 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
On December 28, 1973, Judge Lydick denied the request for a temporary
restraining order, in part because appellees 'have failed totally to make that
showing of ... likelihood of prevailing on the merits needed to justify the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.' These proceedings the Court
says implicitly, were not sufficient to satisfy the test it announces. Why that
should be, even in terms of the Court's holding is a mystery.
Id. Barely a year earlier, the Court had held that, "[w]hen no state criminal proceeding is pending
at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system." See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.
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Doran is still complicated by the murky question of what constitutes a
"proceeding of substance on the merits" or the "embryonic stage" and it
thus remains unclear when a subsequently filed state proceeding can
displace actions already taken in federal court.3 0
This lack of clear
guidance has left the matter to be fleshed out by the lower courts. 3'
Wrestling with this question, courts have reached some consensus
on how to define "proceedings of substance on the merits" and the

Moreover, if abstention is made to turn only on the nature of a proceeding as Hicks and Doran
suggest, it is not clear why the proceedings in Hicks itself failed to satisfy the new standard. See
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. at 929 (declining to provide rationale for proceedings failing
new standard); Hicks, 422 U.S. at 351 (same).
30 See, e,g,, Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (issuing of preliminary
injunction after hearing was "substantial federal court action"); Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1986) (deciding arguments on cross-motions for
summary judgment constituted proceedings of substance on merits); Adultworld Bookstore v.
City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1985) (extending evidentiary hearing on motion
for preliminary injunction constituted substantial proceeding); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637
F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Where, as here, the district court considered affidavits and briefs,
heard extensive oral arguments, and analyzed and ruled on the merits of a motion for preliminary
injunctive relief, Younger does not compel the federal courts to stay their hands."); Meadow
Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Johnson, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (D. Nev. 2000) ("In comparison, a
federal action for prospective relief advances beyond its 'embryonic stage' only upon the conduct
of extensive hearings for a motion for preliminary injunction or the grant of such a motion."). As
an initial matter, these phrases, "proceeding of substance on the merits" and the "embryonic
stage" are theoretically susceptible of at least two different interpretations. See CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, at § 4253. These different readings depend on whether
proceedings are evaluated uniformly or relative to the instant action. Id. The question is whether
a proceeding has substance simply by virtue of the procedures involved (a uniform standard
applied in all cases) or whether substance turns on the relation of the proceedings to the actual
claim or action at bar (a variant standard depending on the facts and law of each case). Id
Similarly, the point at which a federal action matures past the "embryonic stage" may be
evaluated with reference to what the court has done or what it must do in order to reach a
conclusion regarding a plaintiff's actual claims. In general, courts employ an objective inquiry
that defines the "embryonic stage" by the procedures themselves, without reference to the actual
claim. Compare, e.g., Doran, 422 U.S. at 929 (abstaining under Younger where state criminal
summons issued day after federal suit was filed), with Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2
n.1 (1974) (finding abstention inapplicable where notice of ordinance violation issued day after
filing federal suit).
31 Indeed, this was one of the primary bases on which three Justices dissented See Hicks,
422 U.S. at 353 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
There is the additional difficulty that the precise meaning of the rule the
Court today adopts is a good deal less than apparent. What are 'proceedings
of substance on the merits'? Presumably, the proceedings must be both 'on
the merits' and 'of substance.' Does this mean, then, that months of
discovery activity would be insufficient, if no question on the merits is
presented to the court during that time? What proceedings 'on the merits'
are sufficient is also unclear.
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"embryonic stage." In Tucker v. Ann Klein ForensicCenter,32 for example,
the plaintiff filed a federal complaint thirteen months before he eventually
filed an analogous state complaint.33 During that time, the district court
examined and dismissed several of the plaintiff's claims.34 Ruling that the
district court was not required to abstain, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that, when the plaintiff "filed his complaint in the Superior
Court [of New Jersey], his federal action had been pending for more than
one year, both the District Court and this Court had addressed and resolved
the merits of several of [the plaintiff]'s claims, and there had been one
appeal to this Court."3 5 Those circumstances clearly indicated to the court
that the "federal action had progressed beyond the point at which Younger
abstention could properly be invoked."3 6 Not all cases, however, present so
clear a case and the abstention question is routinely closer where federal
"proceedings" are not so obviously extensive.
Typically, courts do not view mere filings-e.g., of pleadings or an
application for a temporary restraining order-or the scheduling of a
hearing on a preliminary injunction as progressing beyond the "embryonic
stage. 3 7 Since a "proceeding of substance" must be "on the merits," courts
also require consideration of an important controversy germane to the
issues presented in the case.38 Questions related solely to abstention or
jurisdiction are usually insufficient.3 9 It remains unclear, however, how
broadly courts should define the "merits" of a proceeding. 40 Federal courts

32

33
34
31

174 Fed. App'x 695 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id.at 697 (setting forth facts).
Id.at 697-98 (outlining procedural history).
Id. at 698.

36

Id.

37

See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 337, 353 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (abstaining under Younger

despite filing of TRO motion and response, twelve affidavits, and additional documents);
Polykoffv. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding federal action in embryonic

stage where state court complaint was filed). In Polykoff the Ninth Circuit found the federal
action was still in the embryonic stage when the state court complaint was filed after a hearing in
federal court on a preliminary injunction motion was scheduled but two days before the hearing
was actually held. Polykoff 816 F.2d at 1332.
38 See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975) (emphasis added) ("When the

criminal summonses issued ... the federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested
matter had been decided.").
39 See, e.g., Ciotti v. Cook Cnty., 712 F.2d 312, 314 (7th Cir. 1983) (ruling abstention not

required over jurisdictional issues).
40

Compare Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (deciding that

amended complaint and intervention by state did not implicate merits), and Mannheim Video,
Inc. v. Cnty. of Cook, 884 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that grant of motion to
dismiss was not "on the merits"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 957 (1990), with For Your Eyes Alone,
Inc. v. City of Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding answer, motion to
dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and hearing denying TRO sufficiently "on the merits").
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have also declined to abstain in cases where "state law expressly indicates

that the [state] proceeding is not a judicial proceeding or part of one," the
proceeding "lack[ed] trial-like trappings," or the specific constitutional

claim at issue could not obviously be adjudicated. 4'
This article focuses on the interpretation of "proceedings of
substance on the merits" and the "embryonic stage" in the context of
preliminary injunctive relief, i.e. a preliminary injunction or a temporary

restraining order ("TRO").4 2 The Supreme Court's piecemeal labeling of

"proceedings of substance on the merits" in this context has unfortunately
fostered an interpretive guessing game among the lower courts. A
reasoned approached is necessary to harmonize these interpretations and
ensure coherent application of the Younger doctrine.43
III. YOUNGER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
With the exception of certain cases defined by statute, courts may
grant preliminary injunctive relief to address a pressing need for immediate
and extraordinary intervention. 44 Granting preliminary relief may, for
instance, sometimes be the only way in which a federal court can protect its
jurisdiction or ensure that litigants have enough time to present arguments
for the exercise of that jurisdiction.45 In broad strokes, a federal court

41

See Telco Commc'ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted) (holding that "informal fact-finding conference" is not judicial in nature); see also
Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that abstention was
inappropriate), aff'd inpart,vacated in part on other grounds, 484 U.S. 193 (1988). "At the time
the plaintiffs filed their federal complaint no state judicial proceeding in which they could have
adjudicated their constitutional claims for return of the seized property was pending."
Monaghan, 798 F.2d at 638.
42 See infra Part IV (detailing how lower courts apply Younger abstention).
41 See id.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) ("The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) ("A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."); Developments in the Law
Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1060
(1965) ("The ex parte temporary restraining order is indispensable to the commencement of an
action when it is the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which the court can provide
effective final relief.").
45 See Hunt v. City of Longview, 932 F. Supp. 828, 837 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (granting
preliminary relief under certain circumstances), aff'd, 95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996).
As a practical matter, a district court must give the parties time to research
and prepare for a preliminary injunction hearing. At the time the motions
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were filed, no
state court proceeding was pending. This court determined that a temporary
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grants preliminary injunctive relief according to the procedural guidelines
of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.46 Generally, a litigant
seeking preliminary relief must make a satisfactory showing that (1) the

movant will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction; (2) the
movant is likely to succeed on the merits; (3) the balance of the harms
favors the movant; and (4) the public interest is not harmed by the granting
of an injunction.47 As injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, the standard
for such preliminary relief is flexible and different courts may address all

or a subset of these factors, as well as other considerations unique to the
case at bar. 48 The Supreme Court, however, has consistently reaffirmed the
requirement that a movant demonstrate irreparable injury. 49 Accordingly,
every circuit employs a test that requires a showing of a likelihood of
irreparable harm.50 It is also important to note that the inquiry into
irreparable injury at the preliminary relief stage is often more stringent than
at the time of judgment. 51 Because courts must act under limited time

restraining order should issue, thus maintaining the status quo until a
preliminary injunction hearing could be held. Given that this exercise of
jurisdiction was proper, it would be nonsensical for this court to abstain
because Defendants assert that had they had the opportunity, they would
have rushed to initiate a quo warranto proceeding before the scheduled
preliminary injunction hearing.
Id.
46

See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (establishing procedure for injunctions).

47

There is no uniform federal approach to granting preliminary injunctive relief.

See

KiRSTN L. STOLL-DEBELL, NANCY L. DEMPSEY & BRADFORD E. DEMPSEY, INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 18-19 (2009).
However, most courts employ similar standards. See 1lA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing standards courts

employ); Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions in FederalCourts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1528 (2011) (same).

See Bates, supra note 47, at 1530-35 (examining flexibility of factors used by federal
courts).
48

49 See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,

314-15 (1999) ("[Preliminary injunctive relief should not have issued if] the plaintiff's prospects
of winning were not sufficiently clear, or the plaintiff was not suffering irreparable injury.");
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) ("In brief, the bases for
injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies."); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) ("The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction
requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of the issuance he will suffer irreparable
injury."); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423,
441 (1974) ("[T]he party seeking the injunction would bear the burden of demonstrating the
various factors justifying preliminary injunctive relief, such as the likelihood of irreparable
injury."); Brownv. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973) (stating lower court properly considered "the
possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted').
50 See STOLL-DEBELL, DEMPSEY & DEMPSEY , supra note 47, at 22-35 (listing elements
employed by each circuit).
51 See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (cautioning
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constraints and without complete briefing of the issues or a full trial on the

merits, courts are understandably more circumspect when it comes to
issuing any kind of preliminary relief.52 In recognition of these limitations,
courts tend to apply a "balancing test that takes account of the irreparable
injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is erroneously denied and the
irreparable injury to defendant if preliminary relief is erroneously
granted." 53 Thus, courts functionally54employ a more exacting irreparable

injury standard for preliminary relief

In the Younger context, the Supreme Court has drawn two

important distinctions between (1) the issuance of preliminary injunctive
relief and the denial of relief and (2) preliminary injunction proceedings
and TRO proceedings.55 In combination with the question of whether
.proceedings of substance on the merits" have occurred in federal court,
the Court's distinctions have generated a patchwork outline to guide the
Younger inquiry in cases involving preliminary injunctive relief 56 Some
rules are firmly established. First, it is clear that the denial of a preliminary
57
injunction does not constitute a "proceeding of substance on the merits."
Likewise, the Court has squarely held that, where state proceedings begin
soon after the filing of a federal complaint, the denial of a TRO is not

sufficient to preclude abstention.58

Conversely, the issuance of a

against reckless use of preliminary injunctions).
52

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE

111 (1991)

("Acting without a full presentation from either side and without time for reflection, the court is
more likely to err.").
5' Id.at 113.
54 See id. at 113 ("[C]ourts at the preliminary relief stages routinely find that damages will be
an adequate remedy for injuries they would consider irreparable after a full trial."). Compare,
e.g., Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202-04
(9th Cir. 1980) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction), with Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming grant of
permanent injunction).
55 The Court's jurisprudence in this area continues to evolve; at least one commentator has
suggested that Younger represents the third iteration in a pattern of interpreting the need for
deference with regard to injunctive relief, which was marked first by Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), and later revised in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See LAYCOCK, supra
note 52, at 134-36 (examining decisions in federal courts regarding federal interference with state
law issues).
56 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)) (finding grant of preliminary injunction beyond embryonic stage);
Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349-52 (holding denial of TRO was not proceeding on merits); Ocean Grove
Camp Meeting Ass'n of United Methodist Churchv. Vespa Papaleo, 339 F. App'x 232, 240 (3d
Cir. 2009) (finding denial of preliminary injunction not proceeding of substance on merits).
57 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 622 (1986)
(holding abstention under Younger doctrine was warranted); cf Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App'x at
240 (finding denial of preliminary injunction not proceeding of substance on merits).
58 See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 348-49 (holding denial of TRO was not proceeding on merits);
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preliminary injunction is considered a "proceeding[] of substance on the
merits. "159

The significance of the issuance of a TRO, however, is not yet
settled.60 While only four courts have addressed this question directly, the
dispute breaks down along two fairly predictable lines: those courts that
view the granting of a TRO as a "proceeding of substance on the merits"
and those that do not. 61 Because the conclusion a court reaches depends on
whether the court accords more weight to the process of obtaining a TRO
versus the significance of granting relief, I term these opposing
perspectives the "procedural" and "substantive" views, respectively. 62 This
section identifies and classifies those courts that have stated a position on
this question. In short, courts in the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have endorsed approaches that treat the issuance of a TRO as a "proceeding
of substance on the merits. 6 3 In contrast, courts in the Third, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits have either held or intimated that the issuance of a TRO is
not sufficient to preclude abstention under Hicks and Doran.64 Though the
remaining circuits have sometimes highlighted the discrepancy between the
Doranv. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975) (same).
59 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 238 (quoting Hicks, 442 U.S. at 349) (finding federal court action
where preliminary injunction granted beyond embryonic stage).
60 See id (questioning whether issuance of TRO was substantial federal court action).
In
Midkiff the Court considered a case in which a federal district court had issued a TRO and a
preliminary injunction before any state court proceedings were initiated relative to the action. Id.
The court held that, "[w]hether issuance of the February temporary restraining order was a
substantial federal court action or not, issuance of the June preliminary injunction certainly was"
and ruled that "proceedings of substance on the merits" sufficient to preclude abstention had
taken place. Id. To date, however, the Court has not revisited the significance of the issuance of
a TRO.
61 Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 200, 211 (D.P.R.
2002)
(holding issuance of TRO is proceeding of substance on merits), and Graham v. Breier, 418 F.
Supp. 73, 77-78 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (holding issuance of TRO is proceeding of substance on
merits), with Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Dep't of Waste Mgmt., 732 F. Supp. 646, 651 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(holding issuance of TRO is not proceeding of substance on merits), and Housworth v. Glisson,
485 F. Supp. 29, 33 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (holding issuance of TRO is proceeding of substance on
merits).
62 See infra Part IV, subsections A & B. Of course, these labels should not be taken to imply
either that the "procedural view" has no substantive component or that the "substantive" view is
completely divorced from procedural considerations. Few concepts in law are so brightly
defined. Rather, these labels are used merely for convenience and reference the different factors
that courts appear to have found most dispositive.
63 See Mass. Delivery Ass'nv. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 43 (1st Cir. 2012) (treating issuance of
TRO as "proceeding of substance on the merits"); For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1217-18 (llth Cir. 2002) (same); Ciotti v. Cook Cnty., 712 F.2d 312,
314-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
64 See Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1986);
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 185-86 (3rd. Cir. 1980); Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Dept. of
Waste Mgmt., 732 F. Supp. 646, 651 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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issuance and denial of a TRO, they have yet to definitively adhere to one
approach.65
A. The "Procedural"View
The "procedural" interpretation is most succinctly expressed in
Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Department of Waste Management.66 In Kim-Stan, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
granting of a TRO was not a "proceeding of substance on the merits"
sufficient to defeat a claim of abstention under Younger. 67 Kim-Stan, Inc.,
a Virginia corporation that operated a sanitary landfill, was attempting to
stem the flow of pollution from its landfill when it simultaneously began
accepting out-of-state waste disposals.68 When evidence of pollution was
discovered at a nearby pond, the Virginia Department of Waste
Management ("DWM") issued an official emergency order directing KimStan to stop accepting waste .69 Kim-Stan brought suit to enjoin the DWM
from enforcing its emergency order revoking the company's permit and a

United States Magistrate Judge granted Kim-Stan's application for a
TRO.70
The Commonwealth of Virginia then filed a complaint in state
court on behalf of the State Water Control Board ("SWCB"), seeking
temporary and permanent injunctive relief and a judgment for civil

65

See, e.g., Hunt v. City of Longview, 932 F. Supp. 828, 834 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("Whether

granting a temporary restraining order is a 'proceeding of substance on the merits' is unclear."),
aff'd, 95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996). The remaining circuits, of course, are the Second, Fifth, Sixth
Tenth, and Federal Circuits. Some courts in these circuits have explicitly acknowledged the lack
of a standard. Others simply have yet to confront the issue directly.
66 732 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Va. 1990).
67 Id. at 650. The district court actually made two alternative holdings. Id. at 649-50. First,
it held that an initial administrative order issued before Kim-Stan, Inc., had filed its complaint had
begun proceedings in state court and therefore that Younger abstention clearly applied. Id. at 649.
The court went on to hold as a "second alternative basis" that the "issuance of the June 16
temporary restraining order ("TRO") was not a proceeding of substance, and therefore no federal
substantive proceeding preceded the filing of the June 23 suit in state court." Id. at 650.
68 Id. at 647 (describing facts).
69 See id. The State Water Control Board ("SWCB") followed by issuing an emergency
special order closing the landfill. Id. Alleging that the leakage was caused by waste buried for
over a year before the incident at the pond, Kim-Stan claimed that that ceasing to accept out-ofstate waste, "a massive project that would ultimately destroy the business," would not solve the
problem and was unnecessary. Id. Several days later Kim-Stan certified that it had complied
with the agencies' orders to cease operations, but inspectors for the DWM found evidence to
indicate that the pollution had not abated. Id. The DWM then issued a second emergency order
revoking Kim-Stan's permit to operate in Virginia and prohibiting the company from accepting
all waste. Id. at 648.
70 Id. at 648.
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penalties against Kim-Stan. 71 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued a TRO that enjoined the SWCB from pursuing any action
against Kim-Stan in any capacity and also enjoined Kim-Stan from further
discharges of pollution.72 At a subsequent hearing for a preliminary
injunction, all parties represented to the court that the matter had been
settled and the TRO was lifted. 73 The DWM issued a superseding
administrative order and entered into a consent decree with both the SWCB
and Kim-Stan.7 4 The settlement to be entered in the case pending in state
court was contingent upon approval by the SWCB, however, which
ultimately rejected its terms. 75 The DWM then issued a notice of a formal
hearing under the state's Administrative Procedures Act to consider the
revocation of the Kim-Stan's operation permit and the company refiled in
federal court to enjoin the pending DWM hearing.7 6
In considering Kim-Stan's motion, the district court focused on the
issue of abstention under Younger.77 Viewing the grant of a TRO as "a
temporary affirmative act... more than a denial of a TRO, yet less than the
issuance of a preliminary injunction," the court found that such a grant was
less substantive than the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 7 " The court
further held that "while the issuance of a preliminary injunction constitutes
'proceedings beyond the embryonic stage,' the issuance of a TRO does
not., 7 9 In particular, the court highlighted several aspects of a preliminary
injunction: that it requires notice; is based on "evidence that goes beyond
the unverified allegations of the pleadings;" usually issues only after "both
parties have presented evidence and argument;" and is an "extraordinary
remedy" granted by a court only upon a showing that a party is "likely to
succeed on the merits" and "will suffer irreparable harm." 8 ° The court
contrasted these requirements with the elements of a TRO, stating that a
TRO "may be issued ex parte;" does not require "specific findings of facts
or conclusions of law;" is designed "only [to] preserve the status quo;" and
is limited in duration to a ten day period. 8' The court in Kim-Stan also

71

Kim-Stan, 732 F. Supp. at 648 (stating procedural history).

72

id.

73

Id.
Id.
Id.

74
75
76

Kim-Stan, 732 F. Supp. at 648.

77

Id. (examining abstention doctrine under Younger).
Id. at 651 (explaining court's finding).
Id. (stating grant of TRO "is somewhere in the middle").

78
79

80 Id.

81 See Kim-Stan, 732 F. Supp. at 651 (distinguishing requirements of TROs from
requirements of preliminary injunctions). Though FED. R. Civ. P. 65 now mandates that a TRO
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emphasized that "a preliminary injunction requires the Court to predict the
outcome on the merits while a temporary restraining order only requires the
Court to . . . maintain the status quo for ten days until
the need for a
82
preliminary injunction or other remedy is determined.,
Similar interpretations of the need to abstain under Younger are
found in the decisions of several other courts. In Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith,83 the Third Circuit held that "where, as here, the district court
considered affidavits and briefs, heard extensive oral arguments, and
analyzed and ruled on the merits of a motion for preliminary injunctive
84
relief, Younger does not compel the federal courts to stay their hands.,
However, in Williams v. Government of Virgin Islands,85 the same court
abstained under Younger despite the issuance of two TROs enjoining action
by a government agency and a stipulation of the parties providing for 8a6
TRO to preserve the status quo until a formal hearing could be held.
Reading these cases in concert, the clear implication is that the Third
Circuit does not view TROs and preliminary injunctions equally under the
banner of "preliminary injunctive relief."
While the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question directly, the
court did note in Fresh International Corporation v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board8 7 that "[i]t may be that issuance of a temporary restraining
order, as opposed to denial of one, is a proceeding of substance on the
merits.""" In an unpublished decision, however, the Ninth Circuit held that
a "TRO [that] was issued the day after the [federal] complaint was filed and
was issued without a hearing and before the defendants had an opportunity
to respond" was not a proceeding of substance.89 Mirroring the language of
Kim-Stan, the court explicitly stated that in the absence of "extensive
hearings on the matter ... [n]either the issuance of the TRO nor the denial
of the preliminary injunction constitute[s] a proceeding of substance on the

may not be issued for more than fourteen days, up from the pervious ten day period, the Rule also
provides that an order can be extended by the court or converted into a preliminary injunction.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
82 Kim-Stan, 732 F. Supp. at 651; see also Aaronv. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir.
2004) (noting district court granted TRO before later converting it to preliminary injunction sua
sponte).
83 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
84 Id. at 186 (determining whether district court should have granted relief).
85 No. 2005-97, 2008 WL 5142181 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Gov't
of Virgin Islands Bd. of Med. Examiners, 360 Fed. App'x 297 (3d Cir. 2010).
86 Id. at *1, *10.
87 805 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1986).
88 Id. at 1358 n.5 (citations omitted).
89 Nitz v. Otte, No. 96-35155, 1996 WL 341140, at *1 (9th Cir. June 20, 1996) (holding

proceeding is not one of substance on merits).
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merits of the case.,90

B. The "Substantive" View
The clearest expression of the "substantive" view is found in
Graham v. Breier9l and in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez.92 In
Graham, the owner of a Milwaukee theatre at which nude and semi-nude
dancers performed, the manager of the theatre, and the dancers themselves
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement
by the Chief of Police of Milwaukee, the City Attorney of Milwaukee, and
the District Attorney of the County of Milwaukee of a state statute and
municipal ordinances prohibiting obscenity. 93 The federal district court
granted the plaintiffs' ex parte motion for a TRO prior to the
commencement of any state action and scheduled a hearing on the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motions
to dismiss the action.94 Shortly after the district judge entered the TRO, a
criminal complaint was filed against the plaintiffs in state court. 95 Because
a party must present at least a prima facie case in order to be eligible for a
temporary restraining order," the court concluded that the issuance of a
TRO, "[w]hile not a final determination of the merits," constituted a
"proceeding of substance on the merits" within the meaning of Hicks and
declined to abstain.96

The issue in Wal-Mart stemmed from a merger between Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"); Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Wal-Mart PR");
and Supermercados Amigo, Inc. ("Amigo").97 On the afternoon that the
merger was to consummate, the Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico issued a
press release in which she publicly declared that she would be filing a
lawsuit against the parties to the merger. 98 Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart PR, and
90 Id.; accord Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Adultworld

Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348, 1350 51 (9th Cir. 1985)) ("A federal proceeding
may be deemed to have passed beyond the 'embryonic stage' if the federal court has conducted

extensive hearings on a motion for a preliminary injunction.").
91 418 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Wis. 1976).

92 236 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.P.R. 2002).
93 Graham, 418 F. Supp. at 74; see WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.20 (West 2011) (regulating lewd
and lascivious behavior in state statute); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 106-7,
106-10 (2008) (regulating obscenity in ordinance).
94 Graham, 418 F. Supp. at 74, 77-78 (describing procedural history).
95 Id. at 77 (discussing motions to dismiss).
96 Id. at 78.
97 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.P.R. 2002) (discussing

background of case).
98 Id.

204

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XVIII

Amigo then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Secretary
alleging equal protection and due process violations and seeking to enjoin
the Secretary from instituting any action against them. 99 The district court
held a hearing after which the court declared it intended to issue a TRO
prohibiting the Secretary from filing an antitrust suit against the parties in
state court. 100 After the hearing, the Secretary filed an "Informative
Motion" that notified the court that she had already filed in state court and
claimed "it was her understanding that at that time, the TRO had not been
issued nor notified to her by th[e] Court."''
The state court then issued a
preliminary injunction ex parte that prohibited the parties to the merger
from completing "any transaction or contract that would operate to
implement the merger.', 0 2 Shortly after, the parties to the merger filed a
copy of the district court's TRO with the state court. 03 The Secretary then
moved to dissolve the TRO on abstention grounds. 4
The Wal-Mart court held that the issuance of a TRO on a contested
matter was a "proceeding of substance on the merits" sufficient to preclude
abstention under Younger.105 Observing that "[w]hether granting or
denying injunctive relief in the form of a TRO or a preliminary injunction
is a 'proceeding of substance on the merits' remains unclear throughout
federal circuits and district courts," the court went on to focus on
circumstances of the issuance of the TRO. 10 6 It noted that the court in KimStan had "distinguished a TRO from a preliminary injunction [by] alluding
to the fact that the former may be issued ex parte and that the opposing
party may not even have 'the opportunity to be heard before the TRO is
issued,"' but did not find this to be dispositive. 0 7 Recognizing that those
procedures "may be the typical situation when a TRO is issued," the court
distinguished Kim-Stan by emphasizing that "the TRO [in Wal-Mart] was
not granted ex parte and both sides were given the opportunity to be heard
prior to issuance of the order. ' 1iO More generally, however, the court noted

99 Id.
100

Id.

101Id. at 203-04 (detailing facts leading up to litigation).
102 Wal-Mart Store&s, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
103

Id.

id.
105 Id. at 209 ("That [TRO] hearing together with the grant of the requested TRO was a
104

proceeding of substance ... on the merits that took place before Defendant filed her state court
action.").
106
107

Id. at 208.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (stating reasoning of court).

108 Id. at 209 (distinguishing TRO review in Kim-Stan Inc. v. Dep't of Waste Mgmt., 732 F.
Supp. 646, 651 (E.D. Va. 1990)). The court in Wal-Mart also drew a more subtle distinction,
explaining in a parenthetical that Kim-Stan held that "granting a TRO by a magistratejudge is not
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that "[i]n addition, even when a TRO has been issued ex parte several
courts have found that granting it was a proceeding of substance on the
merits."0 9 It explained that "the Court had to consider the merits of this
case in ruling on all the elements of the four prong test for temporary or
preliminary injunctive relief, and specifically, the first element which
requires a court to consider a plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits
of his/her claims." 110 Drawing a parallel with the decision in Graham, the
court in Wal-Mart found that "during the TRO hearing that took place ... a
contested matter was decided.""' "That hearing ... with the grant of the
requested TRO was a proceeding of substance, as opposed to a final
determination, on the merits that took place before [the Secretary] filed her
state court action.
Similar approaches have been adopted by other courts."'
In
4
Housworth v. Glisson," the court endorsed the analysis in Graham and
determined that proceedings of substance on the merits had taken place in
federal court once a TRO issued. 1 15 Stating that, "because the movant must
establish a prima facie claim to obtain such relief, 'proceedings of
substance on the merits,' within the contemplation of Hicks had taken place
in the federal suit as of the date the order was signed." 11 6 In For Your Eyes
Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 1 7 the Eleventh Circuit also applied a
similar analysis.""
In that case, the court held that proceedings of
substance on the merits had occurred in federal court even though the
district court denied a TRO. 119 Distinguishing the case from Hicks and
Doran-the court opined that the "procedural facts" were "completely
divergent"-the court focused on the fact that "before ruling on the TRO..
• [it] heard testimony . . . and . . . heard arguments from counsel of both

a proceedings of substance on the merits." Id. (emphasis added). Functionally and analytically,
however, this distinction was not important to the outcome.
109 Id. (citing Housworthv. Glisson, 485 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1978) and Graham v. Breier,
418 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Wis. 1976)).
110 Id. (citation omitted); see also Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st
Cir. 1991) (listing elements of standard for issuing preliminary injunction in First Circuit).
III Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (emphasis in original) (explaining that WalMart court drew its conclusion in agreement with decision in Graham).
112 Id.
113

See cases cited infra notes 114-126 and accompanying text (describing cases that

considered issuance of TRO to be "proceeding of substance").
114 485 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
115 Id. at 33 (citing Grahamv. Breier, 418 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Wis. 1976)).
116
117

Id.
281 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2002).

11' Id. at 1217-20 (describing reasoning).
119 Id. at 1218.
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sides.' 20 In light of this "thorough evidentiary hearing," the court had "no
trouble concluding that . . .proceedings of substance on the merits had
taken place in federal court under Hicks.''
In National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp.,122 the District Court for
the Western District of Missouri also cited Graham and held that abstention

was not warranted because "there had been substantial proceedings . ..
before the State Court proceedings were instituted" where the court had
granted a TRO and had just concluded that a preliminary injunction should
issue. 123 Since the Eighth Circuit is among those courts that apply identical
criteria for obtaining a TRO and a preliminary injunction, it would likely
find that the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief based on those criteria

is a "proceeding of substance on the merits" irrespective of whether that
relief is styled as a TRO or a preliminary injunction. 124 Indeed, in another
case the Western District of Missouri observed in passing that the issuance
of a TRO may be a proceeding of substance on the merits, especially where
the party appealed the TRO and the Court of Appeals treated the TRO as a
preliminary injunction. 125 Several other courts, while not addressing this
issue specifically, have indicated that they would consider the granting of a
,,126
TRO to be a "proceeding of substance.

120
121

Id.
Id. In at least one case the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result, focusing on the extent

and complexity of the issues actually resolved by the court. See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v.
Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1025 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[P]roceedings of substance on the merits
[occurred where b]efore reaching the merits, the trial courts had to resolve venue challenges,
troublesome standing questions, and the applicability of various abstention doctrines.").
122 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
123 Id. at 913 (citing Graham v. Breier, 418 F. Supp. 73, 78 (E.D. Wis. 1976)) (holding
abstention was not warranted because substantial proceedings were instituted before state court
proceedings).
124 See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(advocating that preliminary injunction and TROs include identical requirements). But see Aaron
v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding no "proceeding[] of substance" when
injunction and TRO motions and TRO hearing held). "At the time the court issued its TRO...
the only developments in federal court had been the filing of motions for injunction and TRO and
the TRO hearing." Id. "The state action on the other hand had been scheduled for trial the
morning after the TRO was issued, and discovery and motions had preceded." Id. In Aaron,
however, the "state eminent domain case was ... develop[ed] for some six weeks after it was
filed' and the "state court ruled on permissible discovery, set deadlines, and issued a protective
order" before the plaintiffs ever sought a TRO. Id. Under those circumstances and recalling that
the appeal in question related to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it is unlikely that the
court's ruling turned on whether the issuance of a TRO is a "proceeding of substance on the
merits." See id.
125 Quinn v. Missouri, 681 F. Supp. 1422, 1428 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (refusing to apply Younger
abstention), rev'don other grounds, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988).
126 Cf Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D.S.C. 1977) (noting in dicta that "[o]ne
would suppose that the actual issuance of a temporary restraining order, after a hearing, was a
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IV. TOWARD A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF YOUNGER
The most logical approach-and the approach most consonant with
the policy goals that undergird the Younger doctrine-is to treat the
issuance of a TRO in the same manner as the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Procedural, functional, and equitable considerations all militate
in favor of an approach that applies the same rules to the same decisions
regarding both forms of preliminary injunctive relief' 127 Thus, in
accordance with settled law, courts should continue to abstain in cases
where a state action is filed soon after the denial of a preliminary injunction
or the denial of a TRO in federal court. Conversely, courts should view
both the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO as
.proceedings of substance on the merits" sufficient to preclude abstention
under Younger. This approach embraces the federalism and comity
concerns inherent in the abstention analysis, effectively balances the
interests of both parties to the litigation, and provides clearer guidance to
the lower courts. 2 8
A. ProceduralSimilarity
First, the fact that the procedures for obtaining a preliminary
injunction and a TRO may differ does not justify distinct treatment for the
purposes of Younger. The principle differences between a preliminary
injunction and a TRO are (1) a TRO may be issued ex parte and (2)
129
preliminary injunctions typically remain in effect for longer periods.
Usually, a TRO is sought by a party facing possible irreparable injury
before a Rule 65(a) preliminary injunction hearing can be held. 30 In those
cases, "[t]he order is designed to preserve the status quo until there is an
opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary
injunction and may be issued with or without notice to the adverse
party.""i3 ' As with preliminary injunctive relief generally, every circuit

proceeding of substance in the district court within the meaning of Hicks, but we need not stand
on that ground"), vacatedand remandedon othergrounds, 440 U.S. 445 (1979).
127

See infra Part IV, subsections A, B, and C.

128

See infra Part IV, subsection B.
R. CIV. P. 65(b) (defining when TRO may issue); STOLL-DEBELL, DEMPSEY &

129 See FED.

DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 22-30 (defining when preliminary injunction may issue).
130 See Loral Corp. v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D. Del. 1986) ("[T]he
Court could not have found that the plaintiffs would have been irreparably injured pendente lite if
relief were not granted ... therefore, the motion would have been denied."); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 47, at § 2948 (explaining when TRO is sought in practice).
131 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 47, at § 2951.
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requires a showing of irreparable injury before a TRO will issue. 32
Moreover, when a TRO is granted without notice it must comply with the
Rule 65(b) provisions designed to protect the nonmovant in lieu of the

opportunity to be heard at a formal hearing.'33 These constraints are not
merely prudential but are substantially informed by Supreme Court
precedent emphasizing the constitutional
dimensions of providing notice
13 4
hearing.
fair
a
for
and an opportunity
When the opposing party actually receives notice, however, both
the standard and procedure for obtaining a TRO are substantially the same
as the standard and procedure to obtain a preliminary injunction. 13 5 In fact,
when a TRO is issued after a hearing, courts may simply treat it as a

132

The First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly held that the

standard for a issuing a preliminary injunction and a TRO are identical. See, e.g., Beaty v.
Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying standard for preliminary injunctions to
TROs); Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (same);
Latin Am. Music Co. v. Cardenas Fernandez & Assoc., 2 F. App'x 40, 42 (1st Cir. 2001) (same);
Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d
1224, 1228-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1987)
(same); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(same). Though the remaining circuits have not explicitly applied the same standard to both
preliminary injunctions and TROs, each requires a showing of irreparable harm before a TRO
will issue. See, e.g., Snee v.Barone, 359 F. App'x 281, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming denial
of TRO because movant failed to demonstrate irreparable injury); Estate of Coll-Monge v. Inner
Peace Movement, 524 F.3d 1341, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting a TRO and explaining that
"[iln deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the district court must consider
whether ... the party seeking the injunction will be irreparably injured if relief is withheld");
Wiechmann v. Ritter, 44 F. App'x 346, 347 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) ("To merit a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the movant must establish that... 'she will
suffer irreparable injury if she is denied the injunction ....');P&G v. Bankers Trust Co., 78
F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) ("In issuing a TRO, a district court is to review
factors such as the party's likelihood of success on the merits and the threat of irreparable
injury."); W & D Ships Deck Works, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 638, 647 (Fed. Cl. 1997)
(citations omitted) ("When deciding if a TRO is appropriate in a particular case, a court uses the
same four-part test applied to motions for a preliminary injunction."); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 484 (N.D.W. Va. 2001) (citing Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145,
147 (4th Cir. 1994)) (applying standard for preliminary injunction to TRO); Ecologix, Inc. v.
Fansteel, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that "five requirements necessary
for the issuance of [TRO]" include showing of "irreparable harm").
133 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (setting out procedure for obtaining TRO). This includes
the
application of a heightened standard of review. Id.
134 See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611-16 (1974) (upholding state
procedure as constitutional accommodation of interests of buyer and seller); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1971) (holding Constitution prohibits denying indigents who
seek judicial dissolution of their marriages access to courts); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of
Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (holding absent notice and prior hearing, state prejudgment
ganiislunent procedure violated due process).
135 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (describing TRO process), with FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)
(prescribing preliminary injunction process).
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preliminary injunction. 3 6 Further, some courts also require a party seeking
a TRO to show that it is likely to succeed on the merits and others employ
tests that explicitly engage in a balancing of hardships or evaluate the effect
of the TRO in light of the public interest. 11 7 Under these circumstances, it
is difficult if not impossible to differentiate a TRO and a preliminary
injunction based on the showing that a movant must make to obtain
relief"3 8 Arguably the only salient difference in such cases is the length of
time for which the relief remains in effect. 3 9 Not surprisingly, duration is
the most common basis on which courts distinguish a TRO from a
preliminary injunction, often characterizing TROs merely as brief measures
designed "only [to] preserve the status quo.

136

11140

See, e.g., Sampsonv. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1974) ("[W]here an adversary hearing

has been held, and the court's basis for issuing the order [is] strongly challenged ... we view the
[temporary restraining] order at issue here as a preliminary injunction."); Levas & Levas v. Vill.
of Antioch, 684 F.2d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting claim that different evidentiary standards
and burdens of proof apply to TROs and preliminary injunctions). Casually rejecting formalistic
distinctions between a TRO and a preliminary injunction is more significant than first meets the
eye, as the denial of a TRO is generally not appealable while the denial of a preliminary
injunction is. Compare El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 482 (1999)
("Preliminary injunctions are, after all, appealable as of right."), with Office of Pers. Mgmt. v.
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 473 U.S. 1301, 1303-04 (1974) ("[T]he established rule is that
denials of temporary restraining orders are ordinarily not appealable.").
137 See, e.g., Kelly v. Evolution Mkts., Inc., 626 F.Supp.2d 364, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding balance of hardships favored granting TRO prohibiting former employee from soliciting
former employer's clients); Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F.Supp.2d 853,
869 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (declining TRO where balance of hardships disfavored enjoining
competitor from selling, advertising, or producing product); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of
Commerce, 501 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91-92 (D.D.C. 2007) (refusing TRO when damage to interactions
with foreign governments outweighed interest of organization seeking injunction); Heather K. v.
City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1266-67 (D.C. Iowa 1995) (concluding public interest would
be served by TRO enjoining open burning of refuse in city); Mayo v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office,
839 F. Supp. 697, 699-701 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (denying TRO when moving party failed to show it
was likely to succeed on merits), aff'd on other grounds, 9 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1993); The Nation
Magazine v. Dep't of State, 805 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D.D.C. 1992) (indicating likelihood of success
on merits important in obtaining injunctive relief); Jackson v. Nat'l Football League, 802 F. Supp.
226, 232 (D. Minn. 1992) (finding public interest would be served by issuing TRO against NFL's
first refusal rule); Lafferty v. Carter, 310 F. Supp. 465, 469 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (implying no
decision on merits, but concluding chance of prevailing was not sufficiently clear).
138 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (showing similarity in procedure for TROs and preliminary
injunctions).
139 See sources cited supra note 136 (pointing out discernible similarity between TROs and
preliminary injunctions). As noted previously, one other difference between a TRO and a
preliminary injunction is that a TRO usually is not appealable. See Office of Pers. Mgmt., 473
U.S. at 1304. However, some courts ignore this distinction and it is unclear whether this
difference should affect the classification of a "proceeding of substance on the merits." See
Sampson, 415 U.S. at 94 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140 Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Dep't of Waste Mgmt., 732 F. Supp. 646, 651 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(distinguishing TROs from preliminary injunctions).
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In the Younger context, however, duration is a distinction without a
difference. Focusing solely on the difference in duration of a TRO and a
preliminary injunction leads to a cramped view of the purpose TROs serve,
as well as the impact they can have on federalism and comity interests. To
be sure, preserving the status quo may sometimes imply a smaller
expenditure ofjudicial resources and a mitigated intrusion on parallel state
proceedings. But depending on when and how one defines the status quo,
not to mention the seriousness of the threat to the existing state of affairs, it
is hardly clear that the effects of a TRO and a preliminary injunction are
measurably different. 14 1 Invoking the maintenance of the status quo to
demonstrate that the issuance of a TRO is not a "proceeding of substance
on the merits" gives short shrift to the potential value of preserving the
current balance of interests in a dispute.1 2 Worse, the view that merely
preserving the status quo renders a TRO a less significant undertaking than
a run-of-the-mill preliminary injunction may get the law exactly wrong.
Preliminary injunctions are routinely crafted simply to preserve the status
quo and several circuits actually require a heightened showing when
preliminary injunctive relief might alter the current positions of the
parties. 43 Though perhaps relevant to other aspects of litigation, duration
does not augment or diminish the significance of granting preliminary
44
relief.
In sum, on procedural grounds, there is little reason to accord
different treatment to a TRO and a preliminary injunction under Younger.
Preliminary injunctions and TROs both require a showing of substantially
the same elements. 45 Moreover, when the opposing party receives notice

141 In fact, courts and commentators have criticized the use of the concept of the "status quo"
for this reason. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1989)
(advocating focus on extent of injury in lawsuit); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 749
F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1984) ("'[S]tatus quo' is ambiguous."); Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary
Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 166 (2001) ("The trend in the

federal circuits toward a heightened preliminary injunction standard in cases involving mandatory
orders that upset the status quo has little to recommend it."); Developments in the Law
Injunctions, supra note 44, at 1058 ("The concept status quo lacks sufficient stability to provide a
satisfactory foundation for judicial reasoning."). "[The] focus always must be on prevention of

injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo." Ortho Pharm. Corp., 882
F.2d at 814 (citing Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1971)).
142 See For your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that holding attempts to balance interests); Houghton v. Cortelyou, 208 U.S. 149, 156
(1908) (stating TRO appropriate if status quo need not be preserved).
143 See generally Lee, supra note 141, at 115-21, 143-47 (discussing heightened burden used
by Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
144 See Sampson, 415 U.S. at 86-88 (finding extending TRO did not limit on grant of
preliminary injunction).
145 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (describing contents and scope of preliminary injunctions and
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of a TRO, the standards and procedures employed are practically
identical. 46 Finally, a focus purely on the fact that a TRO is of shorter
duration overlooks the significant impact that a TRO can have on both the
parties and the litigation. 147 Duration alone does not measurably alter the
effect of preliminary
injunctive relief on the issues relevant to Younger's
48
1
goals.
policy
B. FederalEquity Power,Federalism,and Comity
Second, both the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO are exercises of federal power that may impinge on state
prerogatives. When a federal court determines it to be legally appropriate
to exercise both its jurisdiction and its authority to issue preliminary
injunctive relief, that issuance should be sufficient to preclude abstention
under Younger. The Supreme Court appears tacitly to acknowledge this
reasoning. Recall that whether "proceedings of substance on the merits"
have occurred in a case involving a preliminary injunction varies
depending on whether the court actually issues the injunction. 149 But why
is this so? The standard ostensibly concerns the actual proceedings that
have occurred; the only salient difference between an issuance and a denial
is the outcome, the proceeding itself is the same. Why should an issuance
and a denial be treated differently? The strongest response is that, despite
the language in Hicks and Doran, whether injunctive relief is actually
granted is also important under Younger. This interpretation makes sense
because the issuance of any injunctive relief is an exercise of federal equity
power that bears on the federalism and comity concerns identified by the
Court. 5 ° Thus, although Hicks and Doran focused on the procedural
aspects of litigation to determine if "proceedings of substance on the merits
have taken place," the actual issuance of preliminary injunctive relief is
also relevant.
This conclusion has important implications for the issuance of a

TROs).
146
147

See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (stating procedures to obtain preliminary injunction or TRO).
See sources cited supra note 136 and accompanying text (comparing TROs and

preliminary injunctions).
148 Id.
149 Compare Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (finding issuance of

preliminary injunction was "proceeding of substance on the merits"), with Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 622 (1986) (finding denial of preliminary
injunction does not constitute "proceeding of substance on the merits").
150 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (discussing concerns of federalism and
comity).
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TRO. The temporary nature of a TRO in no way diminishes the fact that
its issuance is still an exercise of federal power that may affect state
interests. Even acting solely to prevent irreparable injury or to preserve the
status quo is still an exercise of federal equity power that can invade the
prerogatives of the state, stay or disrupt state proceedings, and effect the
relative positions of the litigants. 15 1 For example, in Hawaii Housing
Authority v.Midkffi 152 the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court
seeking temporary and permanent relief from Hawaii's Land Reform Act
of 1967i.1
The district court initially issued a TRO that prevented the
Housing Authority from proceeding against the plaintiffs' estates before
later issuing a preliminary injunction. 1 54 The forced delay of state
administrative proceedings allowed the federal court to conduct
.proceedings of substance on the merits" in the form of the preliminary
injunction hearing and, in that respect, the TRO prevented the state from
taking administrative action that would likely have deprived the court of

jurisdiction. 155
A federal district court in Hunt v.City ofLongview 156 followed that
course when members of the Longview City Council brought an action in
federal court to prevent the state district attorney from initiating a quo
warranto proceeding to remove them from office. 157 The district court first
issued a TRO that prevented the initiation of any quo warranto proceedings
until a preliminary injunction hearing could be held. 158 Later arguing that
the federal district court should abstain, the City pointed out that the district
court's issuance of a TRO had prevented it from bringing a quo warranto
action before the district court could hold a hearing. 159 The court
acknowledged that "but for the granting of the temporary restraining order,
151

See

Aviam Soifer & H. C. Macgill,

The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing

Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1215 (1977) (analyzing federalism in context of

substantive due process).
152

467 U.S. 229 (1984).

153 Id.at 238 (setting forth factual and procedural history).

Id. (noting state court proceedings still not initiated).
Id. As noted, the Court did not reach the question of whether the issuance of a TRO was
itself a "proceeding[] of substance on the merits." Id. "Whether issuance of the February
temporary restraining order was a substantial federal court action or not, issuance of the June
preliminary injunction certainly was." Id.(citing Doranv. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929-31
(1975)).
156 932 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996).
157 See id.
at 832 (listing qualifications for holding office in Longview). A quo warranto
154
155

proceeding challenges the authority of a party to exercise a specific right or power and may be
brought in Texas by a district attorney or the attorney general pursuant to TEx. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 66.002. Id.at 833-35.
158 Id. at 833.
159 Id. at 837.
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a petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto
would have been filed in state district court before this court could have
held a preliminary injunction hearing. ,160 However, it was not persuaded
that this compelled abstention. 161
Likewise, in Westin v.McDaniel,162 a criminal defense attorney
facing prosecution for hindering an undercover officer sought a preliminary
injunction in federal court to enjoin the state's attempt to indict him. 163 The
state district attorney's first attempt to bring charges had been
unsuccessful. 164 Before the district attorney could make a second attempt
to obtain an indictment, the federal district court entered a TRO preventing
the grand jury from hearing the evidence against the attorney. 16 Noting
that "[t]he temporary restraining order . . .[had] stopped an entirely new
attack against [the defendant] after the State's case had been dismissed,"
the court concluded that no state criminal proceedings were actually
pending. 166 The court proceeded to exercise jurisdiction, observing that
"the temporary restraining order allowed for substantial proceedings on the
merits, in the form of [a] preliminary injunction hearing . .. to occur in
[federal] court before the State took any steps against Westin. ,167 Thus, the
issuance of the TRO prevented state action that would otherwise have
ousted federal jurisdiction, a fact freely acknowledged by the district
CoUrt.

168

Appropriate recognition of and respect for the equitable powers of
federal courts also supports viewing any issuance of preliminary injunctive
relief as a "proceeding of substance on the merits." The issuance of such
relief, even in the form of a TRO, clearly has at least some implications for
federalism and comity. 169 As other scholars have noted, the creation of

160 Id. (emphasis added).
The district attorney and the city attorney had provided sworn
affidavits averring that this assertion was true. Id.
161 Hunt, 932 F. Supp. at 837 (stating holding).
162
163
164

760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991), afd, 949 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id.at 1564.
Id. at 1565 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (West 2012)) (dismissing charges

because no evidence suggested that law was broken "'knowingly and willfully"').
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1568 (adding such case would not become "pending" until grand jury returned true
bill).
167

Westin, 760 F. Supp. at 1568 (explaining why federal court could exercise jurisdiction).

168

Id. at 1568 n.3 ("The court is ... aware that its own temporary restraining order...

allowed proceedings of substance on the merits to occur here [in federal court] before the state
grand jury could hear evidence against [the defendant], but d[id] not believe that this fact

change[d] the outcome.").
169

See, e.g., Herbert F. Wilkinson, Anticipatory Vindication of Federal Constitutional

Rights, 41 ALB. L. REv. 459, 527 (1977) (citation omitted) ("An affirmative finding of both
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judge-made abstention doctrines largely tracks the expansion of state
administrative agencies and echoes a "concern with federal district judges'70
telling state officials how to carry out their jobs as a matter of state aw.",1
Moreover, the expansion of Younger was further informed by a concern
that, "given the commingling of powers within state courts and agencies,
federal court involvement in state administrative action might present
problems of legitimacy." 171 Thus, the expansion of Younger arguably
began as an attempt by the Supreme Court to accommodate these
burgeoning administrative regimes. 72 Buttressed by the "sense that federal
courts, unlike state courts, should not be working partners in the
establishment of state policy," this history evinces the preference under
Younger for restraint regarding the use of federal equity power. 173 This
preference exists irrespective of whether a court's federal equity power is
exercised through the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction.
The issuance of a TRO should be accorded the significance
commensurate with any exercise of that power. As is evident in Midkiff
Hunt, and Westin, a TRO can substantially impact state objectives. The
manifestation of federal authority inherent in the issuance of a TRO thus
intrudes on the exercise of state power and should be viewed in the same
manner as the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 174 In light of the
similar repercussions for federalism and comity, it makes more sense to
treat the issuance of any preliminary injunctive relief in the same regard.
Further, neither federalism nor comity is served by abstaining after a
federal court has already intervened through an exercise of its equitable
powers..
At that point, a state can win only a Pyrrhic victory, for

injury and 'likelihood of prevailing' [in the context of a TRO in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975)] would have clearly had federalism implications, since the effect would have

been to restrain further seizures by order of the state court.").

170 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative
State, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 613, 646 (1999) (analyzing rise of administrative state and its
implications for judicial federalism). More in depth treatment of this subject is regrettably

beyond the scope of this article.
171 Id. at 647 (suggesting reasons behind expansion of Younger doctrine).
172 See generallyid at 646-48.
173
174

Id. at 646.
Cf Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 85-88 (1974) (viewing issuance of TRO as issuance

of preliminary injunction).
175 Cf Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259,
264 n.8 (1977) ("[P]rinciples of comity and federalism do not require that a federal court abandon

jurisdiction it has properly acquired simply because a similar suit is later filed in a state court.");
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1974) (citation omitted) ("Younger v. Harris is
not involved here, as on August 2, 1972, when this federal suit was initiated, no state case had
been started."). Moreover, the plaintiffs in such disputes are significantly disadvantaged as they
must replead, reargue, and refile according to new state rules. See Town ofLockport, 430 U.S. at
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relinquishing federal jurisdiction will not undue a prior intervention. If
Younger aims to preserve the dignity of state tribunals and encourage
respect for state courts' ability to adjudicate constitutional claims, a better
approach is to place greater emphasis on the significance of issuing
injunctive relief in the first instance. 176 This purpose is best served by
recognizing that the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, whether in
the form of a preliminary injunction or a TRO, is a "proceeding of
substance on the merits."
In short, there is little functional difference between the issuance of
a TRO and a preliminary injunction. Although temporary, the issuance of a
TRO is still an exercise of federal equity power that implicates notions of
federalism and comity. Moreover, the historical evolution of the policy
considerations underlying Younger suggest that the potential of a TRO to
intrude on state interests evokes the same concerns attendant to other forms
of equitable relief' 177 As such, there is little reason to draw a distinction
between the manifestations of federal power inherent in the issuance of a
TRO and the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Lastly, federalism and
comity are only obliquely served by requiring abstention where a TRO has
already issued.
C. Equitable Concerns
Finally, viewing both the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
the issuance of a TRO as "proceedings of substance on the merits" avoids a
myopic focus on structural concerns and better accommodates the interests
of the parties. Although federalism and comity have come to the fore in the
abstention calculus, the Younger doctrine was originally grounded on
equitable principles. 78 As such, equitable maxims shaped the abstention

264 n.8.
176

See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 151, at 1159 (detailing costs of equitable relief).

It

should be noted, however, that little additional emphasis is likely required. Equitable relief has
always been an extraordinary remedy that also imposes costs on the federal courts and courts do
not lightly grant such relief.
177 See generally Lee, supra note 141, at 140-57 (laying out history of preliminary injunctive
relief).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (emphasis added) ("[O]ur holding rests on the
absence of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention."); cf
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) ("The policy of equitable restraint expressed in
Younger v. Harris, in short, is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution
provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional
rights."). Younger held that federal courts should abstain because the state criminal proceeding
provided a forum in which the defendant could raise his constitutional claims and thus that the
state proceedings provided an adequate remedy. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. This, of course, is
178
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inquiry from its inception.
Historically, "courts of equity" have "interfere[d] by way of
injunction to prevent wrongs; whereas, courts of common law ... grant[ed]
redress only, when the wrong [wa]s done."180 Equitable relief is only
available, however, in the absence of "a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy" at law.181 The lodestar of any equitable inquiry is the likelihood
of irreparable injury. Equity seeks to prevent irreparable injuries that
materially alter the positions of the parties, change the issues to be litigated,
or deprive the court of jurisdiction.182 In consonance with its overall
orientation toward fairness and its basis in jurisdiction over actual persons,
equity is particularly concerned with irreparable injury to individual

interests."" Such injuries may be obvious where a party faces the risk of
losing real or physical property that cannot be replaced through eventual
damages. 8 4 However, one can also suffer irreparable injury with respect to
intangible interests and federal courts have recognized a risk of irreparable
injury with respect to eviction, harm to medical health, harm to the

a well-recognized equitable rationale wholly unrelated to considerations of comity and
federalism. The Court did not reach the question of whether injunctive relief was precluded
under the Anti-Injunction Act, a statutory measure more clearly predicated on federalism
concerns. See id.at 54 ("[W]e have no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which
prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings 'except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress' would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case.").
179 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54 (indicating importance of equitable principles).
180 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 22 (Isaac F. Redfield ed.,
10th ed. 1870) (finding courts of equity different in nature, mode, and degree from courts of
common law). A full treatment of the evolution of equity jurisprudence in the United States is
beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent and more complete discussion of the history of
equity in the United States, see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 47-48, 130-31 (2d. ed. 1985) (discussing history of equity in U.S.); Stanley N. Katz, The
Politics of Law in ColonialAmerica: Controversiesover Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the
Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY
257, 262-82 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, eds., 1971) (explaining how courts of equity
developed in new world); Kristin A. Collins, "A Considerable Surgical Operation": Article III,
Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 281 (2010) (comparing
courts of equity with courts of common law).
181 See STORY, supra note 180, at 24.
182 See id. at 23 (reiterating Lord Redesdale's account of "[t]he jurisdiction of a court of
equity").
183 See

JOHN

W.

EDMONDS, REPORTS OF SELECT CASES DECIDED IN THE COURTS OF NEW

YORK,NOT HERETOFORE REPORTED, OR REPORTED ONLY PARTIALLY 85 (1883).
[If] both parties ... are resident within the territorial limits ... the courts of
equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties, and direct them,
by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit. In such a case, these courts
act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction.
Id.
184 See LAYCOCK, supra note 52, at 37-48 (describing irreparable injury as that which cannot
be replaced with damages).
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environment, and violations of tribal sovereignty."" Likewise, irreparable
injury can inhere in constitutional violations, such as the abridgement of
the freedom of speech, infringement of religious beliefs, interference
with
86
the right to vote, or imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. 1
Preliminary injunctive relief is often essential to protect a party's
rights until the power of the courts can be brought to bear. When a court
determines that a TRO should issue to safeguard a party's constitutional
interests, that conclusion is premised on a judicial finding of a likelihood of

irreparable injury and a recognition that no adequate legal mechanism
exists to ensure the immediate protection of those interests .iS Requiring
abstention after issuing a TRO trivializes the court's determination that
federal intervention is necessary and may prejudice the party for whose

185

See, e.g.,

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,

480 U.S. 531,

545 (1987)

("Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages.");
Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 2001)
(illustrating irreparable injury because money damages insufficient to undo plaintiff's damages);
Raichv. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (recognizing that restricting access
to marijuana by individuals with chronic illnesses constituted irreparable injury), rev 'd, 352 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2003); Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F.Supp.2d 209, 220 (D.D.C. 2003)
(finding plaintiffs "me[t] their burden of demonstrating irreparable hann" with respect to killing
of swans); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Stovall, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (D. Kan. 2002)
(concluding issue of tribal sovereignty "can not be measured in dollars"); McNeill v. N.Y.C..
Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The threat of eviction and the realistic prospect
of homelessness constitute a threat of irreparable injury."); LAYCOCK, supra note 52, at 41-42
(citing cases in which damages were insufficient to remedy violation of right).
186 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("[L]oss of First Amendment
freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); Jolly v. Coughlin,
76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding irreparable injury where officials sought to keep prisoner
in "medical keeplock" during pending lawsuit); Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 811, 82728 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding that cutting prisoner's hair in violation of sincerely held religious
beliefs constituted irreparable harm), rev 'd on other grounds, 422 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2005);
Cardona v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 785 F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citations
omitted) ("Abridgment or dilution of a right so fundamental as the right to vote constitutes
irreparable injury.").
187 See generally Friedman, supra note 10, at 531 (detailing roles of state and federal courts);
Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal
Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (same); Redish, Abstention,
supra note 10, at 72, 86 (same); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1105 (1977) (same). This is not to say that state courts (or state administrative proceedings) are
necessarily less protective of federal rights, a question that is a subject of fierce debate among
many academics. For the purposes of this article, it is enough to note that state and federal
standards for awarding equitable relief designed to protect constitutional rights vary. At least
some scholars suggest that this recognition means federal courts are more protective of federal
rights. See Neuborne, supra, at 1105 ("[Dismissing what is termed the] myth... that state courts
will vindicate federally secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower federal
courts."). Nor can one hypothesize that some other, extralegal remedy might be available, "for, if
[a remedy] be doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction." STORY, supra note
180, at 24.
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benefit the TRO was granted.' 8 8 This concern is particularly salient in the

context of "reverse removal," where a state can oust otherwise proper
federal jurisdiction.'8 9

This development has met staunch criticism. 190

188 Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123 (1975) (reviewing principles governing judicial
intervention in Younger). The observation is buoyed by the fact that, where "exceptional
circumstances creat[e] a threat of irreparable injury 'both great and immediate,"' courts need not
apply Younger at all. Id.
189 See Fiss, supra note 10, at 1135-36 (describing "reverse removal").
By pursuing the logic of "Our Federalism" to utter extreme, Hicks
fundamentally altered the structure of the federal jurisdictional scheme: it
vested the district attorney not the aggrieved citizen with the power to
choose the forum, and, indeed, the nature of the proceeding in which the
federal constitutional claim would be litigated. In essence, Hicks created
in such stark contrast to the post-Civil War [sic] removal statutes-a reverse
removalpower: a power to remove a case from the federal court to the state
court. After a federal anticipatory suit is filed, the district attorney can
initiate a criminal prosecution against the aggrieved citizen and by that
action abort the federal suit and remit the citizen to adjudicating his claim as
a defense in a criminal prosecution in the state court.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
357 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court's new rule creates a reality which few state
prosecutors can be expected to ignore. It is an open invitation to state officials to institute state
proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction."); Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church, Inc.
v. Tex. Dep't of Human Res., 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 438 (5th
Cir. 1980).
Plaintiffs suggested during oral argument that the filing of the state suit was
done deliberately to strip this Court of jurisdiction and that the Court should
find such conduct offensive. Even assuming such is the case, it is nothing
more than the precise result predicted by the four dissenters in Hicks when
they characterized the majority opinion as "an open invitation to state
officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction."
That prediction, here fulfilled, obviously did not command a majority of the
Court and therefore can be of little use to these Plaintiffs.
Id. (citation omitted).
190 See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 356 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
[The new rule went] much further than simply recognizing the right of the
State to proceed with the orderly administration of its criminal law; it ousts
the federal courts from their historic role as the 'primary reliances' for
vindicating constitutional freedoms. This is no less offensive to 'Our
Federalism' than the federal injunction restraining pending state criminal
proceedings condemned by Younger v. Harris.
Id. Other scholars have agreed. See Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven
Weeks in the Life ofa Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1704-05 (1989).
Even if you meet all the constitutional and statutory requirements for
making a claim in federal court, it turns out that the judge alone can still tell
you to go to or stay in a state court or agency . . . . It turns out that
sometimes even the lawyer for the state officials you're suing can make you
go to a state court or agency .... It turns out that even if you never wanted
to be in a state agency or court, you might not only be required to go there,
but you also might never get to federal court either ....
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Thus, treating a preliminary injunction and a TRO differently in terms of
"proceedings of substance on the merits" runs the risk of undervaluing the
risk of irreparable injury to the party in the case actually before the court.
Where a party makes a showing that a fundamental federal interest is
sufficiently in danger of being irreparably harmed to obtain preliminary
injunctive relief, it makes little sense to require abstention simply because
the relief issued in the form of a TRO.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a comprehensive standard
governing the application of Younger to proceedings concerning
preliminary injunctive relief.
Struggling to define "proceedings of
substance on the merits" and the "embryonic stage," the lower federal
courts have reached different conclusions as to the significance of the
issuance of such relief These disparate decisions hinder a coherent
application of Younger in a context where extraordinary intervention is
sought to prevent irreparable injury to vital interests. A uniform standard
governing the application of Younger to these proceedings would better
observe the federalism and comity concerns that inform the abstention
analysis, balance the interests of litigants, and provide guidance to the
lower courts.
This article maintains that where preliminary injunctive relief is
denied, a court has not exercised its federal equity power or expended
judicial resources to award relief and, under those circumstances, it makes
sense that no "proceedings of substance on the merits" sufficient to
preclude abstention have taken place. Conversely, because both a TRO and
a preliminary injunction bear on the policy concerns at the core of Younger,
it is logical to view both the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO as "proceedings of substance on the merits." Therefore,
when a federal court determines it to be legally appropriate to exercise both
its jurisdiction and its authority to issue preliminary injunctive relief that
issuance, whether in the form of a preliminary injunction or a TRO, should

Id. (citations omitted); Bryce M. Baird, Comment, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights
Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 BUFF. L.
REV. 501, 531 (1994) (citing Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349) ("In effect, this rule provides the state
prosecutor a 'reverse removal' power to defeat the plaintiff's choice of a federal forum simply by
adding him to (or initiating) an action against him in state court prior to any 'proceedings of
substance on the merits' in federal court."). But see Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the
ConstitutionalLimits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REv. 811, 837
(1991) ("[Hicks] delineate[s] a constitutional line between the outer limits of federal judicial
power and the correlative power inherent in the states' residual sovereignty.").
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be sufficient to preclude abstention under Younger. In other words, the
issuance of any preliminary injunctive relief by a federal court should be
considered a "proceeding of substance on the merits" that takes a case
beyond the "embryonic stage." This approach makes sense in light of
procedural, functional, and equitable considerations; and viewing the
issuance or denial or preliminary relief in the same way for both forms of
relief promotes a neat, parallel framework that provides clear guidance to
courts. Hopefully this article will contribute to the distillation of a
coherent, consistent standard governing abstention in these cases.

